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To prevent the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19),
some types of public spaces have been shut down while others
remain open. These decisions constitute a judgment about the rel-
ative danger and benefits of those locations. Using mobility data
from a large sample of smartphones, nationally representative
consumer preference surveys, and economic statistics, we mea-
sure the relative transmission reduction benefit and social cost
of closing 26 categories of US locations. Our categories include
types of shops, entertainments, and service providers. We rank
categories by their trade-off of social benefits and transmission
risk via dominance across 13 dimensions of risk and importance
and through composite indexes. We find that, from February to
March 2020, there were larger declines in visits to locations that
our measures indicate should be closed first.
COVID-19 | social contact | transmission risk | social welfare
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is primarily spread bydroplets of mucous and saliva from those who are infected.
Infected people are often asymptomatic (1), so, in the absence of
a comprehensive system to test and trace individuals by infec-
tion status, all physical proximity is potentially dangerous. To
address this concern, policy makers have implemented a wide
variety of regulations on work, locations, and gatherings. Perhaps
due to the infeasiblity of directly restricting visitor density, many
of these restrictions vary by the type of the location.
We conceptualize the decision to shut down a location as
a trade-off between infection risk and benefits. In this paper,
we make an empirical contribution regarding which types of
locations pose the best and worst risk–reward trade-offs. Govern-
ments should use this analysis to inform their decision making as
they attempt to achieve their public health goals (such as R< 1)
at minimum social cost. To do so, we combine several mea-
sures of the importance and danger of categories of stores and
locations. We consider 26 categories that correspond to North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) industries or
combinations thereof.
Danger and Importance Measures
We collect data of three types. These are data on the category’s
transmission risk, economic output and costs, and consumer
value.
To quantify the potential contribution of a location to disease
transmission (i.e., its danger), we utilize a fine-grained dataset
on mobility from approximately 47 million smartphone devices
in the United States. The data are collected by Safegraph, and
record visits to 6 million points of interest. The “visitation” data
include information about the total number of visits, total num-
ber of visitors, home census tract of visitors, and timing and
length of visits. The “points of interest” data include informa-
tion on location (full address), six-digit NAICS code, branding,
and area.
The 26 location categories of interest account for ∼57% of all
unique visits from January 2019 through March 2020. Out of all
categories, full-service restaurants (sit-down) is the most popular
in terms of both number of visits and unique visitors. Between
February and March 2020, we observe a 24.9% drop in the total
number of visits at all locations included in the analysis, reflect-
ing the social distancing implemented in March. To account for
the fact that our data cover only a fraction of individuals in the
United States, we upscale every observed visit as a function of
the visitor’s home census tract to approximate the real number
of visits and visitors for each location.
We create nine monthly level measures of a location’s dan-
ger. Four are based directly on total visit data. These are total
visits, total unique visitors, person-hours of visits during crowd-
ing of more than one visitor per 113 square feet (reflecting the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s “six-foot” social
distancing rule), and person-hours of visits during crowding of
more than one visitor per 215 square feet (reflecting the German
social distancing guideline of one customer per 20 m2).
Using information on the home census tract of visitors, we
add five additional measures. Four are analogous to the first
four, but restricted to visits by individuals age 65 y and older
(age estimates are based on the assumption that visits from older
guests are proportional to their share of a census tract’s popula-
tion; we use visits from all guests in calculating location density).
The final danger measure is the median distance traveled to a
location.
To identify the cumulative danger of an entire category
of locations, we sum the individual measures of all locations
within the category (except for distance traveled, where we use
the visit-weighted average). While, in this analysis, we weigh
all nine danger measures equally, our results are very simi-
lar to those when restricting attention to the first four danger
measures.
We measure the benefits of a location as coming from both its
economic and consumer contributions. Our economic data come
from the most recent edition of the US Census Statistics of US
Businesses. Across our 26 categories, there are 1,427,433 firms
and 2,024,839 establishments, compared to 2,029,514 geoloca-
tion points of interest. Our measures of economic importance
consist of annual payroll, receipts, and employment. Our 26
categories encompass 32 million employees, 1.1 trillion dollars
Author contributions: S.G.B., A.C., and C.N. designed research, performed research,
analyzed data, and wrote the paper.y
The authors declare no competing interest.y
This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).y
Data deposition: Data, survey instrument, derived statistics and code are available at
GitHub (https://github.com/chrisnic12/RationingContact).y
1 To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: benzell@chapman.edu,
avinash.collis@mccombs.utexas.edu, or nicolaides.christos@ucy.ac.cy.y
2 S.G.B., A.C., and C.N. contributed equally to this work.y
First published June 10, 2020.
14642–14644 | PNAS | June 30, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 26 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.2008025117
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
at
 C
ha
pm
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
n 
S
ep
te
m
be
r 
28
, 2
02
0 
BR
IE
F
RE
PO
RT
EC
O
N
O
M
IC
SC
IE
N
CE
S
Fig. 1. Grid indicating dominating and dominated categories. A cell is gold
if the row category is better on all nine risk and four importance dimensions
than the column category, and blue for the converse.
in annual payroll, and 5.6 trillion dollars in annual receipts.∗
To measure consumer welfare, we conducted a nationally rep-
resentative survey of 1,099 US residents. Respondents were
recruited through Lucid, a market research firm, during April
13 to April 15, 2020. The survey was determined to be exempt
by Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT’s) Institutional
Review Board (Project E-2115). The sample is representative by
age, gender, ethnicity, and region (2). Each respondent takes
part in a series of single binary discrete choice experiments
(3) where they choose which location, among two options, they
would prefer to be open, whether or not the location is cur-
rently open. Discrete choice experiments have been widely used
to measure valuations of market and nonmarket goods. To make
responses consequential and incentivize respondents to respond
truthfully, we gave them a chance to earn an additional monetary
reward which was linked with their choices (4). Each respondent
participated in a series of binary discrete choice experiments.
We solicited a total of 32,970 decisions. Our consumer impor-
tance measure ranks categories by the proportion of times it is
preferred over others.
Results
We juxtapose how different locations fare along our four dimen-
sions of importance (consumer importance, employment, pay-
roll, and receipts) and nine dimensions of transmission risk
(visits, unique visitors, person hours at moderate density, and
person hours at high density; the same four measures for only
individuals age 65 y and older; and average median distance
traveled). The core idea is that locations offering better trade-
offs should face looser restrictions. The most conservative way
to make this comparison is to look at whether there are any
locations that dominate another in all dimensions of lower
transmission danger and higher importance. This measure is
conservative in the sense that any possible weighed aggregate
measure of risk or importance will yield the same pairwise
comparison.
*Usually, public economic analyses of welfare exclude changes in labor costs in evaluat-
ing a policy, because the workers directly employed by the policy would have collected
the same wage elsewhere. However, during this crisis, there is dramatic underemploy-
ment. Therefore, the work forces of these industries have very low opportunity costs,
and their production should be counted in social surplus.
Of our 26 categories, 13 do not dominate and are not domi-
nated by any other. Of the 13 remaining categories, 1) gyms and
2) cafes, juice bars, and dessert parlors are the two categories
with the most dominated pairings (Fig. 1). According to our mea-
sure, each of these locations should be opened only after banks,
dentists, colleges, places of worship, and auto dealers and repair
shops. Within types of stores, we find electronics stores and fur-
niture stores should be opened before liquor and tobacco stores
and sporting goods stores. The two locations that come out the
best in this measure are banks and finance, with six dominant
pairwise comparisons, and dentists, with three dominant pairwise
comparisons.
Another way to determine which locations offer the best trade-
offs is to create overall indexes of danger and importance, and
to look for outliers. We create our danger index as the aver-
age rank of a category in the nine danger measures. We create
our importance index as the average rank of a category in
our three economic importance and one consumer importance
measures. We up-weight the consumer importance measure so
that it is equally weighted with the three economic importance
measures.
There is a strong positive relationship between the danger
of a category and its importance (Fig. 2A). However, there
are clear outliers. Categories in the top left corner have high
importance but low danger, and vice versa for categories in the
bottom right corner. We estimate a linear regression, includ-
ing an intercept term, of the importance index as a function
of the danger index. Categories are colored by the value of
the residual, which corresponds to the quality of the trade-off.
We find that banks, general merchandise stores (e.g., Walmart),
dentists, grocery stores, and colleges and universities should
face relatively loose restrictions. Gyms, sporting goods stores,
liquor and tobacco stores, bookstores, and cafes should face rel-
atively tight restrictions. Our methodology also allows us to do
similar analyses for different regions. Splitting our analysis by
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan locations yields remarkably
similar results, suggesting that the urban–rural divide is not an
important dimension for policy makers.
There is a dramatic decrease in visits to all of these loca-
tions from February to March 2020. A natural final question is
whether these reductions in visits are spread evenly across loca-
tions, or whether the reductions follow the risk–reward trade-off
we measure. Fig. 2B plots the percent decrease in visits to a
location type, from February to March 2020, as a function of
“importance–risk trade-off favorability” (i.e., the gold to blue
categorization in Fig. 2A). Weighing by February 2020 visits,
there is a strong positive relationship. This suggests that at least
some of the cost–benefit analysis we measure is being internal-
ized by US consumers, businesses, and policy makers. Two of the
largest outliers are 1) colleges and universities and 2) hardware
stores. We find colleges to offer a relatively good trade-off, but
most have shut down, leading to a 61% decline in visits. Con-
versely, we find liquor and tobacco stores to be relatively poor
trade-offs (due to mediocre economic importance and small busy
stores), yet the number of visits to this category has declined by
less than 5%. Hardware stores are the location which has seen
the largest increase in visits, as individuals scrounge for personal
protective equipment and other home supplies. It is important
to note that these visitation changes are due to a mix of fed-
eral, state, and local government, business, and individual level
actions.
Discussion
A potential limitation of this analysis is that visitors to some
location types are more concentrated within the space. We can
partly account for this effect by measuring which locations offer
services that require close physical proximity. In a complemen-
tary analysis, we merge in Occupational Employment Statistics
Benzell et al. PNAS | June 30, 2020 | vol. 117 | no. 26 | 14643
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Fig. 2. (A) Category cumulative importance index and cumulative danger
index. The color scale reflects the residuals, by category, of a linear regres-
sion of the importance index on the danger index. Golden categories have
disproportionately high importance for their risk, and blue categories have
disproportionately low importance. (B) Change in location category visits
versus the category importance–risk residual. Marker sizes are proportional
to total visits in February 2020.
(OES) data on occupational employment mix by category and
Occupational Information Network (O∗NET) data on occupa-
tional tasks. 1) Dentists and 2) barbershops and salons are the
only two categories with a high share of workers requiring intense
physical proximity (72% and 58%, respectively, of workers in
these industries have proximity scores of over 90%). Addition-
ally, movie theaters, gyms, and amusement parks have a high
share of workers requiring a moderately high level of physical
proximity (57%, 48%, 42%, respectively, of workers in these
industries have proximity requirement scores of over 80%). We
do not include these data in our main analysis because the need
to be in close contact with visitors impacts both the risk of a
category and the economic cost of shutting a category down.
A category with a high share of workers who do not require
close proximity to visitors will find it easier to reengineer itself
to increase social distance, as well as to allow for work from
home. Most retailers can offer curbside pickup rather than forc-
ing customers to enter crowded stores (and, indeed, most states
are encouraging curbside pickup). Locations can also be made
safer through use of masks. This is especially important for loca-
tions like museums, with limited physical touching. On the other
hand, locations like gyms both emphasize physical contact and
make mask use unpleasant.
A more important limitation of our data is that we incorporate
no information about linkages or complementarities between
industries. If one industry is shut down, it could decrease the
revenues, employment, consumer surplus, and visits of another
(e.g., by depriving them of an important input), or increase them
(e.g., by effectively “raising the cost” of a close substitute; we may
be seeing this with restaurants and grocery stores). In the cur-
rent analysis, we effectively assume that all industries are perfect
substitutes.
There are other limitations in our analysis in terms of factors
that impact our rankings of both location importance and risks.
On the importance side, our binary choices do not yield infor-
mation on the intensity of preferences, and leave out potentially
important externalities from some locations (on mental or phys-
ical fitness, for example). Moreover, our survey sample size is
limited, and further research should use a major survey research
firm and larger samples. On the risk side, we fail to account for
the fact that some locations encourage reckless physical activities
or might disproportionately accommodate “superspreaders.”
Governments and civic organizations across the world have
made different decisions about how to implement and relax
social distancing measures. As they do so, they have various tools
at their disposal. In the United States, many of these restric-
tions have been location category specific. Details have varied
from state to state, with gyms, places of worship, and liquor
stores receiving particularly heterogeneous treatment. Why are
different states adopting such different policies? One possibil-
ity is state-level variation in the importance or danger of a
category. This variation would have to be separate from urban–
rural heterogeneity, which we find to not make much of a
difference.
Another possibility is that, in the absence of empirical evi-
dence, states are being forced to make decisions in the dark.
If so, we recommend that policy makers conduct analyses sim-
ilar to the ones described in this paper, specific to their regions.
Regional mobility, credit card transaction, and other relevant
data are available from a variety of sources. This should be com-
plemented with regularly conducted large-scale online consumer
preference surveys to account for heterogeneity across regions,
demographics, and time.
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